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Protection or Provocation?  
Police Control of Muslim Immigrants in Combating Terrorism

by

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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

The Faculty of Social Science and Humanities

Criminology

University of Ontario Institute of Technology

April 2017

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### Abstract

Counter-terrorism efforts have considerable bearing on the relationship between Muslim immigrants and law enforcement. As frontline law enforcers, the police are responsible for securing community support and acting as first responders to criminal activity. Following September 11, many laws have aggressively targeted Muslim immigrants under the belief they pose the largest security threat. Such outcomes threaten to increase targeted police responses, traditional police approaches, marginalization, legal and human rights violations and decrease preventive measures, community policing, and ultimately erode police legitimacy. This paper explores current counter-terrorist efforts and how such responses display spillover effects that impact all Muslims. It is argued that, in some instances, these responses are counterproductive and increase the likelihood of terrorist activity. An assessment of more fruitful policing strategies will be provided.

*Keywords:* counter-terrorism policing, community policing, Muslim immigrants, preventive measures, discrimination

### **Introduction**

In a time when counter-terrorism policing strategies are becoming a higher priority, police services have reverted to traditional tough on crime approaches (Poynting & Mason, 2006; Tyler, 2012). Some governments view punitive and discriminatory approaches, which target Muslim immigrant populations, as the only way to protect citizens from future attacks (Bush, 2001; Kirk, Papachristos, Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Poynting & Mason, 2006). However, these strategies often tarnish relationships between the police and Muslim immigrants, which enflames tension and increases distrust from nationals in their countries of origin (Cole, 2002). Following September 11 (9/11), a precarious political climate emerged, which has marginalized Muslim communities. Dominant counter-terrorism policing approaches elicit many undesired and harmful outcomes, which breed alienation, attenuate police legitimacy, and violate legal and human rights. Fortunately, there is some promise in alternative community-based approaches as they avoid these harmful consequences and address terrorism more effectively. This paper argues that police responses have direct bearing on their relationship with Muslim communities, which, in turn, can either prevent or instigate future incidents.

This paper begins by broadly exploring the concept of transnational terrorism and providing a brief overview of the punitive climate of restriction and discrimination within the context of the War on Terror (Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004; Townshend, 2011; White, 2012). This is followed by a discussion on Islamophobia and the scapegoating of all Muslims as perpetrators of terrorism. Moreover, an overview of the contours, hazards, and consequences of current models of counter-terrorist policing is offered. Before offering a brief conclusion, the benefits of a cooperative, consensual, and community-focused approach are provided.

This research addresses issues that are often overlooked in counter-terrorism scholarship. Many nations have framed aggressive policing efforts as necessary and desirable; however, it is equally important to consider their deeper impacts and consequences (Jonathan-Zamir, Weisburd & Hasisi, 2014). There is a lack of consensus on effective counter-terrorism policing and confusion surrounding the role of police officers (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Lum, Haberfeld, Fachner & Lieberman, 2009; McGarrell, Freilich & Chermak, 2007). Although there is no definitive solution, this research details how police officers can engage with Muslim populations and thereby mitigate the potential hazards of current approaches.

Furthermore, by applying the core dimensions of community policing, it is possible that the relationship between Muslim populations and law enforcement may be rectified and strengthened (Grabosky, 2008; Mastrofski, 2006; Skogan & Steiner, 2004; Skogan, 2006; Weisburd et al., 2009). The application of a community policing approach may prevent terrorist activity, eliminate the harmful effects of system avoidance, and remove feelings of discrimination, alienation, and marginalization (Brayne, 2014; Stuart, Armenta & Osborne, 2015). This research enhances the existing body of counter-terrorism policing literature by exploring the feasibility of community policing approaches and the relationship between police personnel and Muslim populations.

## **Terrorism**

Terrorism does not have a clear-cut definition; the only consensus regarding the concept is its elusiveness (Ganor, 2009). Any understanding of terrorism must include three components: (1) the use of force, (2) the targeting of innocent people, and (3) political motivations (White, 2012). Accordingly, this paper approaches terrorism as “the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians...to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious,

etc.)” (Ganor, 2009, p. 21). Following this definition, the overriding goal of terrorism is to instill fear by altering public perceptions through extreme violence (Innes, 2006; Townshend, 2011).

There are two modes of terrorist violence: symbolic and signal. The symbolic mode of terrorism occurs when violence is “directed toward a symbol of the social and cultural order to which the perpetrator is opposed” (Innes, 2006, p. 223). For instance, the 9/11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon would be categorized as a symbolic mode of terrorism since the Pentagon is a symbol of the United States’ military power (Turk, 2004; Welch, 2006). The signal mode of terrorism demonstrates to the public that there is a risk and threat that they should be aware of, which usually takes place in public places where many civilians are likely to be injured or killed (Aas, 2007; Innes, 2006).

Terrorist organizations often attempt to cause polarization among all members of society, which causes the public to pressure decision-makers, and ultimately make changes that will benefit the interests and goals of terrorist organizations (Deflem, 2010; Walsh, 2016). Paradoxically, extreme government responses are often precisely what terrorist organizations desire (Ganor, 2009; Walsh, 2016). Terrorists revel in the fact that, to fight against terrorism, it is necessary to renounce many democratic and liberal values, as terrorism is inherently anti-democratic (Ganor, 2009; Townshend, 2011). The nature of terrorism places Western nations in a precarious position, as inaction will lead to public disapproval; yet, responses also satisfy terrorists to some degree (Jonathan-Zamir, Weisburd & Hasisi, 2014; Smelser, 2007). When terrorist incidents occur, it becomes difficult to re-establish a strong sense of security, which causes the population to become suspicious of others from different ethnic and religious backgrounds (Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Fassin, 2011; Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010; Satzewich, 1989; Spencer, 2008).

**Post-9/11 political climate: War on Terror and the securitization of migration**

Migrants of different ethnonational and religious origins have historically faced considerable discrimination and suspicion specifically in the US and UK (Fassin, 2011; Fox & Akbaba, 2015; Hanniman, 2008; Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010; Satzewich, 1989; Shon, 2011; Spencer, 2008; Stuart et al., 2008; Stumpf, 2006; Taylor, 2002; Van der Leun, 2006). The threat of transnational terrorism has reignited such trends in many Western countries with Arab and Muslim populations as they are viewed as posing the greatest security risk (Poynting & Mason, 2006; Spencer, 2008; Taylor, 2002; Waiton, 2009). The terrorist attacks that occurred in the past two decades have given rise to punitive sanctions and justification for warfare, while also providing law enforcement personnel with a new scapegoat to target (Kappeler & Kappeler 2004; Poynting & Mason, 2006; Welch, 2006). Fearmongering schemes and exaggeration of the imminent threat of terrorism were used to ignite the War on Terror and justify many policing and security measures that would have been excessive prior to 9/11 (Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004). The War on Terror was waged under the guise of self-defence; however, it has increasingly become more offensive over the past decade (Townshend, 2011).

Many changes in Western immigration policies occurred after 9/11, which were guided by a criminal justice agenda and part of the reason for widespread moral panics concerning migrants of different ethnonational and religious origins (Bibler Coutin, 2005; Eck, 2006; Fassin, 2011; Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010; Walsh, 2016). The terrorist suspect became viewed as the most extreme threat and danger to all individuals (Bosworth & Guild, 2008). The recurring theme among immigration policies is the need to control, secure and remove undesirable immigrant populations. Contemporary federal immigration powers facilitate discriminatory practices by the government and law enforcement, which essentially demonize entire populations

(Fox & Akbaba, 2015; Hanniman, 2008; Taylor, 2002). These responses have institutionalized a “culture of control” and escalated punitive responses to crime (Garland, 2001, p.139).

Former President Bush issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive *Combating Terrorism through Immigration Policies* one month after 9/11, which proves that the fight against terrorism is contingent on immigration measures (Bush, 2001; Spencer, 2008). During this time, 762 immigrants and foreigners in the US were detained as potential suspects and charged for violating immigration law rather than criminal law (Bibler Coutin, 2005). In turn, the number of US deportations more than doubled from 165,000 in 2002 to 400,000 in 2009 (Kirk et al., 2012)<sup>1</sup>. The criminalization of immigrants is currently enabled by legislation such as the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (the Sensenbrenner Bill), which deemed illegal immigration a felony, rather than a civil offense (Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010).

An additional set of laws were devised to explicitly link terrorism to immigration. Sections 411 to 418 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT) empower law enforcement officials to detain non-citizens without having a hearing and without proving that the individual in question poses a security risk (Spencer, 2008; Taylor, 2002; Waiton, 2009). The United Kingdom also enacted similar legislation with the passage of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA) (Spencer, 2008). The ATCSA empowered the Home Secretary to detain foreign individuals without trial and denied access to asylum if they are suspected terrorists (Bibler Coutin, 2005; Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Spencer, 2008). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was also incorporated into the Department of

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<sup>1</sup> Of the 400,000 deportations in 2009, 67% were non-criminal immigrants.

Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003; subsequently, thousands of Arab and Muslim immigrants were arrested and detained (Spencer, 2008).

Furthermore, the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) also requires foreign nationals from 25 predominantly Muslim states to register with the DHS and notify the INS of any changes in home residence, employment, or school (Leiken & Brooke, 2006; Spencer, 2008). The US and UK have notably increased intrusive forms of information collection at the border with the recent inclusion of biometric information from certain immigrants (Stuart et al., 2015). With this turn to “crimmigration”, Muslim and Arab immigrant status is stigmatized (Stumpf, 2006). The War on Terror changes perceptions of the immigration issue by reframing immigration and Muslims as a security issue, which contributes to public acceptance of broader punitive approaches (Poynting & Mason, 2006). The implementation of stricter immigration policies and controls is viewed as an “important tool in the ‘war on terrorism’” (Spencer, 2008, p. 2). Unfortunately, this causes further systemic issues for all Muslim and Arab immigrants, which have unintended effects and place Western nations in a greater state of precarity.

### **Scapegoating and Islamophobia**

Considering the policies outlined above it is evident that Muslims are the main scapegoats of terrorism (Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Welch, 2006). Scapegoating refers to the displacement of blame onto innocent populations that are already subject to discrimination due to their race, ethnicity, or religion (Welch, 2006). While a fraction of the world’s Muslim population is responsible for terrorism, all Muslims are treated as categorically suspect. The notion of perpetual suspicion is reproduced through Islamophobia, which refers to “a fear or hatred of Islam and its adherents that translates into individual, ideological and systemic forms of



oppression and discrimination” (Hanniman, 2008, p. 273). The anti-Muslim reaction following 9/11 was marked by fear and avoidance of Muslim immigrants, which led to the marginalization of the entire Muslim population in Western nations (Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Hanniman, 2008). Islamophobia has produced discriminatory forms of political, social, economic and military control. Islamophobic rhetoric sustains inequality as it pertains to the main systems of power (Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Welch, 2006). Consequently, the security agenda in Western democracies has become known as the Securitization of Islam (SOI), which is defined as “a process that is constructed around a perceived Islamist threat and the promotion of actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Fox & Akbaba, 2015, p. 175; Murphy, 2007). The SOI expands many police powers and invokes harsher sanctions concerning potential threats associated with Muslim immigration (Cesari, 2009). The SOI reinforces the unique position of Muslims as perpetual suspects and victims (Cesari, 2009; Murphy, 2007).

As such, Hanniman (2008) states that Muslims have three distinct fears: “fears of being victims of terrorism themselves, fears of backlash/hate crimes towards their communities if there is a terrorist incident, and the fear of being the innocent victim of an anti-terrorism measure” (p. 278). When a population is viewed as a threat, it becomes easier to convince the public that there is a need for harsher sanctions, but, there is little regard for those who are affected by these sanctions. Many Muslim immigrants claim they are disrespected in ways that range from being asked inappropriate cultural questions to property damage in the form of bigoted graffiti, verbal harassment, physical assaults, and homicide (Hanniman, 2008; Welch, 2006). In Canada, the Toronto Police Service reported a 66% increase in hate crimes post-9/11, and 37% of all hate crimes were directed against Muslims (Hanniman, 2008). In many Western nations, the sight of difference is viewed as a sign of failed integration (Tufail & Poynting, 2013). The veil, for

instance, is a physical symbol of “a ‘threat’ to British values” (Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012, p. 270). Similarly, men who have beards, wear shalwar kameez (traditional clothing), or engage in prayer in the street during Muslim festivals are often targeted and viewed with suspicion (Tufail & Poynting, 2013). Muslims have become an easy target for scapegoating, public scrutiny, and police racial profiling due to their perceived failed integration (Hanniman, 2008; Jamil, 2014; Poynting & Mason, 2006; Welch, 2006).

The media also propagates the image of all Muslims as monsters, savages, pedophiles, evil, and extremely violent (Awan & Zempi, 2015; Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012). The media is a prominent source of anti-Islamic rhetoric since it disseminates fearmongering messages to millions of people (Ameli & Berali, 2014). Media outlets often follow international events that portray Muslims as evil and extremely violent to attempt to control the views of citizens in nations where these events are not taking place, which directly impacts their views on Muslims in their country (Awan & Zempi, 2015).

Elected officials in many Western nations have also contributed to the scapegoating of Muslims by targeting entire Islamic populations (Poynting & Mason, 2008). Some politicians have candidly stated that it is necessary to enter mosques and schools to ensure that there is no promotion of terrorism, which fosters an environment that allows discrimination and harassment of Muslims (Poynting & Mason, 2008). Increased surveillance, harassment, and mistrust facilitate radicalization and justify Muslim claims of the West vs. Islam dichotomy (English, 2009; Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, 2010; Walsh, 2016). Under these circumstances, it is important to consider the effects of scapegoating and Islamophobia as they potentially incite terrorism.

**The consequences: Frustration, aggression, radicalization**

Alienation increases the likelihood of radicalization since there is a strong link between feelings of otherness and terrorism. Many terrorists have expressed “feelings of alienation, powerlessness and shame and an urge for revenge”, which often stem from perceived procedural injustice due to discriminatory immigration laws and policing strategies (Fischer, Harb, Al Sarraf & Nashabe, 2008; Pickering, McCulloch & Wright-Neville, 2008, p. 11; Tyler et al., 2010). Frustration/aggression theory provides a preliminary framework to explain why someone might resort to terrorism. The key tenets of frustration/aggression theory posit that a buildup of tension within an in-group often results in aggression towards an out-group (Welch, 2006). For example, the political and social backlash that Muslim immigrants have experienced has been a great source of anger, frustration, and contempt (Pew Research Center, 2006; USIP, 2010).

Many Muslim individuals have felt that they have no other choice but to retaliate (Pew Research Center, 2006; Welch, 2006). The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) completed a qualitative study of 2,032 individuals who chose to leave their country of origin to fight for al-Qaeda in the US and, unsurprisingly, approximately 30% of these individuals became terrorists because they were seeking revenge. This suggests that their motivation is fuelled by frustration with the treatment from society in addition to the conflating effects of discriminatory immigration policies, racial profiling, and ultimately, over-policing (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Jamil, 2014; Poynting & Mason, 2006; USIP, 2010). USIP explicitly states that there is a need to ensure that approaches to counter-terrorism are sensitive to the factors driving terrorism to avoid further marginalization and alienation of individuals at risk (USIP, 2010). In this regard, police services have attempted to develop new approaches to respond to terrorism.

**Dominant police responses to terrorism**

The confluence of political messages, the media, and public hostility paves the path for a misguided sense of risk and insecurity, which has resulted in a “disproportion between risk and response”, which is reflected in the dominant ways that police services respond to terrorism (Brodeur, 2010, p. 39; Innes, 2006). In many Western democracies, the role of police is to serve rather than dominate, and police are encouraged to view the public as clients and partners (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Grabosky, 2008; Townshend, 2011; Tyler, 2012). However, when 9/11 unfolded, there was a great shift in policing as terrorism raised an unparalleled set of problems that were seemingly incompatible with the innovations of the decade before. There was a shift from community policing to counter-terrorism policing approaches, which invoked responses that distanced the police from the community (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014).

To many law enforcement officials, the foundation of counter-terrorism is surveillance and control (Brayne, 2014; Grabosky, 2008; Thacher, 2005). This ideology is evidenced in the recent changes to police information collection, increased technological surveillance devices, and an increasingly overt police presence in public places populated by suspect populations (Lum et al., 2009; Innes, 2006). Much like immigration policies, police use surveillance and control as tools to ensure that certain populations are restricted, which extends the concept of “the enemy within” (Hasisi, Alpert & Flynn, 2009, p.178). Israel and the UK, for instance, have been struggling to balance counter-terrorism and conventional policing for many decades and the main challenges are centred upon the conflicting nature of traditional, authoritative policing and contemporary, community policing (Grabosky, 2008; Weisburd et al., 2009). To this end,

examples of preventive and reactive responses that specifically impact Muslim populations will be outlined.

**Preventive responses.** One of the notable responses to terrorism is the shift from low policing to high policing (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Brodeur, 2010). High policing (often synonymized with counter-terrorism policing) involves a shift in focus towards macro crimes, which are crimes that are viewed as more of a threat to society (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). More specifically, Lum et al. (2009) have thematically classified seven overarching counter-terrorist police responses. The prominent approaches that contribute to targeted police responses and the marginalization of Muslims will briefly be discussed. Some of the most problematic preventive responses are increases in general deterrence, surveillance, and monitoring, which requires police officers to “target vulnerable [and suspect] populations” (Lum et al., 2009, p. 110; Innes, 2006). These responses also include the prospective offender stop and search, which involves identifying and surveilling those who may be at risk or are suspected of being involved in terrorism (Innes, 2006). These responses require police officers to limit access to places for certain individuals, conduct “random searches”, rely on closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage, and increase police presence in all areas (Lum et al., 2009, p. 110). These efforts often lead to the targeting of Muslim populations (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015).

**Intelligence-led policing.** Additional preventive responses to terrorism include changes in strategic planning, which involve new risk assessment measures, predictive formulas and enhanced information collection and analysis (Lum et al., 2009). Relatedly, many Western nations have considered the value in adopting an intelligence-led policing (ILP) model as a preventive measure to gather information on potential terrorist threats (McGarrell et al., 2007; Simeone, 2008; White, 2012). ILP builds on the framework of community and problem solving

policing and places an emphasis on the targeting and identification of high rate and chronic offenders (McGarrell et al., 2007). ILP also differs in that it takes a centralized approach and serves an intelligence function rather than a decentralized approach that serves a community relations function (Simeone, 2008). Intelligence-led initiatives reveal pertinent information on planned terrorist incidents when the correct individuals are identified and questioned, which has been used to penetrate and break some of the most difficult terrorist cells (McGarrell et al., 2007; White, 2012). ILP is also beneficial when implemented from an all-crimes approach, since street-level crimes are sometimes found to be linked to the funding of terrorism activities for terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda (McGarrell et al., 2007; Simeone, 2008). Although all ILP initiatives are not directly related to terrorism, ILP uncovers information on criminal activity that may be linked to terrorist activity (McGarrell et al., 2007). Moreover, ILP relies on technology that goes beyond face-to-face interaction to gather information and prevent crimes (Mastrofski, 2006; Simeone, 2008).

***Militarization of police.*** An additional counter-terrorism response is the implementation of new technologies, which include surveillance, communication, rescue technologies, and the increase in tactical police apparatuses that resemble combat apparatuses (i.e. the militarization of police) (Mastrofski, 2006; White, 2012). The magnitude of terrorism causes police services to band together and it may be tempting to militarize police responses (White, 2012). The militarization of police becomes apparent when police tactical units are called to deal with hostage situations and gunmen (White, 2012). Officers within these tactical units are equipped with military-grade weapons and often use military commands (White, 2012). Murray (2005) argues that police are resorting to traditional aggressive policing methods and roles, which

constructs the dependence on a paramilitary structure and inherently requires the police to distance themselves from the public.

**Reactive responses.** There are three identified reactive responses to terrorism, which include: accommodation, criminalization, and suppression (Guelke, 2006). The first reactive response, accommodation, involves treating individuals involved, or suspected to be involved, in a lenient manner. This legitimizes the terrorists' cause and acknowledges their message, which is what terrorists are often seeking (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015; Guelke, 2006). For instance, one of the main messages of terrorist organizations is that democratic states are hypocritical since they pride themselves on freedom, fairness, and justice and terrorists do not believe that these liberties are delivered equally (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015; Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Grabosky, 2008; Townshend, 2011). When the police respond in a punitive way, they are administering perceived injustice, which fuels further terrorism, as it confirms the belief that democratic states are hypocritical (Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Grabosky, 2008; Townshend, 2011). To counteract this effect, police officers treat terrorists leniently to suggest that democracy is exercised (Guelke, 2006).

The second reactive response, criminalization, refers to terrorists being treated the same as street criminals; however, this response disregards terrorists' cause and may result in recurrent acts of terrorism for the root cause to be acknowledged (Ganor, 2009; Innes, 2006; Townshend, 2011). The third and final reactive response, suppression, is the most severe form of treatment where terrorists are punished more severely than any other form of criminal (Guelke, 2006). Suppression ultimately confirms and validates terrorists' cause as it reveals the repressive nature of the government or country under target (Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Guelke, 2006). Suppression is illustrated in the targeted police efforts towards radical extremists, which often validates

terrorists as a form of provocation and evidence to suggest that democratic states are the real problem (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015).

Of the three responses noted above, there is no confirmation as to which is most effective; however, the most commonly used responses to terror in Western democracies are a combination of suppression and criminalization (Guelke, 2006; Townshend, 2011). The elusiveness of the effects of police responses is an important understanding since the terrorists' reactions to these responses are very significant in terms of future terrorist incidents (Kirk et al., 2012; Poynting & Mason, 2006). With an unfounded understanding of their effects, it is difficult to improve future counter-terrorist policing models (Innes, 2006). It is undeniable that The War on Terror is being fought by many government bodies and there is very little contention that the police should be involved; however, the role of police remains unclear and responses to terrorism are inconclusive at best (Townshend, 2011; Tyler, 2012).

### **Hazards of counter-terrorist policing approaches**

Unfortunately, current counter-terrorist policing approaches pose many hazards and negative consequences. At the most direct level, the shift to high policing causes communities to become neglected, which decreases relationship-building opportunities (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Hasisi et al., 2009; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014). Moreover, the police spend more time guarding at-risk spaces in response to prospective threats and less time responding to other criminal activity (Hasisi et al., 2009). High policing is also difficult to control and the nature of terrorist threats may also provide police officers with a false sense of righteousness to violate the law in terms of intelligence gathering and prosecutions (Hasisi et al., 2009; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014). The precarity of the new role of police officers involved in counter-terrorism ultimately leads police to revert to traditional models of policing that were utilized before the



community policing era (Hanniman, 2008). Furthermore, high policing leads to a decrease in community crime prevention funding and an increase in homeland security resources (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014). However, the effects of counter-terrorist policing go beyond the obvious tangible and fiscal drawbacks.

**Perpetuation of avoidance, frustration, aggression, and radicalization.** Many of the noted preventive counter-terrorist policing approaches are the source of resentment, anger, and frustration expressed by Muslims as an extension of the consequences of scapegoating and Islamophobia (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Spalek, 2011). Counter-terrorist policing often increases levels of legal cynicism among Muslim immigrants and the “belief that the law and the agents of its enforcement...are illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill-equipped to provide equitable and adequate public safety” (Brunson & Miller, 2006; Kirk et al., 2012; Stuart et al., 2015, p. 244). When a population experiences poor integration measures and discrimination they may engage in system avoidance (Brayne, 2014; Stuart et al., 2015; Van der Leun, 2006). Furthermore, when police legitimacy is called into question, people are less inclined to cooperate with the police (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Tyler et al., 2010).

Additionally, individuals who have experienced similar unfair measures in their country of origin are shown to be more avoidant of police officers and reluctant to engage in communication that may assist the police (Cole, 2002). Overly punitive laws are not always seen as legitimate by individuals because they do not seem fair or justified. When individuals view laws as morally just, they are more likely to abide by the law (Kirk et al., 2012). Punitiveness has become rooted in Western culture and many populations continue to believe it is the most effective way to deal with “serious anxiety-ridden problem[s]” (i.e. crime in general) (Garland, 1996, p. 460). Counter-terrorism policing also extends the culture of fear and control, which

causes Muslim populations to fear contact with legal and government institutions (Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Garland, 2001; Stuart et al., 2015). Minority groups are often afraid to approach the police as they are aware that they are viewed as the *enemy within* and they will often face oppressive measures that reinforce this discrimination (Garland, 2001; Hasisi et al., 2009). System avoidance can also be extended to hospitals, schools, and public places, which can potentially lead to higher poverty, morbidity, and mortality rates, all of which, affect societies at large (Stuart et al., 2015).

Cole (2002) notes that when Muslims are targeted based on their ethnic origin and religion, nationals also become antagonistic in their homeland. Lack of cooperation from the countries that house terrorist and extremist ideologies will only beget more terrorism in Western democracies (Cole, 2002; Spencer, 2008). When Western governments act in ways that overtly support counter-terrorist policies, al Qaeda supporters and other terrorist groups become more aggravated because it reinforces the West vs. Islam dichotomy (Spencer, 2008). The obvious and longstanding demand to remove Muslim immigrants from France, for instance, is arguably part of the reason for the ongoing increase in terrorist incidents in this country (Guiraudon & Joppke, 2001; World Atlas, 2015). Racial and religious profiling is inherent in counter-terrorism policing, which places an enormous strain on the relationship between the whole Muslim population and law enforcement and ultimately reflects government values (Tyler, 2012). When disenfranchised individuals are suspected of terrorism this also aggravates the whole Muslim population (Spencer, 2008). Furthermore, it is arguable that labelling crimes involving Muslims, as terrorism, instead of criminal activity, allows law enforcement officials to advance the anti-Muslim agenda while also challenging long-established laws, rules, and norms (Murphy, 2007;

Turk, 2004). If the label of terrorism is applied, the amount of harm, violence, and persecution of Muslim immigrant populations may be excused (Turk, 2004).

Current policing approaches also cause latent responses from the greater populace, which breeds alienation and arguably contributes to increases in terrorism (Fassin, 2011; Fox & Akbaba, 2015; Hanniman, 2008). The treatment of entire populations as threats or folk devils only increases the tensions and divisions between populations, which is what terrorists seek (Morgan & Poynting, 2012). The whole response to terrorism essentially becomes counterproductive as it is arguably predicated on targeting Muslims. Addressing terrorism as “Islamic terrorism” causes the whole population to suffer and many Muslims may feel hostile towards non-Muslim citizens who hold these views (Pickering et al., 2008, p. 117). To put these views into perspective and understand the extent and scope of issues that have arose, it is important to consider the countries that are ranked highest on the Global Terrorism Index<sup>2</sup>. Israel, the UK, the US, France and Ireland are among the highest ranked Western democracies (World Atlas, 2015). The number of terrorist incidents reflect the relationship between Muslims and all members of society, to some degree, since research suggests that those who experience strained relationships with their countries of residence are more likely to engage in terrorism (Hanniman, 2008; Innes, 2006).

As an extension, second-generation Muslim immigrants also experience varying forms of discrimination and marginalization, which has led many individuals to identify more with their Muslim identity than that of the Western nation they were born in (Fassin, 2011; Murphy, 2007; Tufail & Poynting, 2013). Tufail and Poynting (2013) reveal that all second-generation Muslim immigrants in their study express that, despite living their whole lives in the UK, their nationality

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<sup>2</sup> The Global Terrorism Index ranking system is determined based on the number of terrorist incidents within each country.

and belonging is still questioned and often denied. Additionally, second-generation Muslim immigrants frequently experience unwarranted traffic stops and accusations of engaging in terrorist activity from the police (Tufail & Poynting, 2013). Cultural exclusion and targeting may cause second-generation immigrants to become further immersed in extremist interpretations of Islam and feel increased resentment towards the nation they live in (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014).

**Counterproductive nature of police responses.** In terms of ILP measures, specifically, they reveal a unique set of issues as intelligence is currently gathered in ineffective and counterproductive ways (Townshend, 2011). For instance, some Internet-based intelligence gathering tools include email, web portals, and web forums; however, this can become problematic as it also leads to issues regarding information sharing and surveillance of all civilians (Simeone, 2008). Many civilians are very reluctant to share information with the police, especially minority immigrant populations, because of the distrust between the police and these populations (Hasisi et al., 2009; Simeone, 2008). However, when information is voluntarily provided, the quality of information received is questionable as most civilians are not well informed on terrorist/terrorist activity identification (Hasisi et al., 2009). The poor quality of information is due to reasons such as ignorance and unawareness of new terrorism methods, which are more sophisticated and unlikely to be viewed with suspicion by civilians (Hasisi et al., 2009). Unfortunately, this results in the police relying on false reports of terrorist activity, which they are still required to investigate. Not only does this waste time and resources, but it also places potentially innocent individuals under suspicion and creates greater levels of distrust.

Trust between communities and the police is imperative to the functioning of both entities (Armenta, 2016; Pickering et al., 2008; Skogan, 2006). Without mutual trust, it is challenging for police personnel to gain the intelligence necessary to combat issues such as

terrorism, which places individuals in a state of precarious victimization (Grabosky, 2008).

Unfortunately, “the intersection of counter-terrorism and policing may serve to erode community confidence in policing, particularly in communities with a concentration of religious minorities” (Grabosky, 2008, p. 4). As many researchers suggest, targeting of individuals has very detrimental effects on populations since innocent individuals are often unwarrantedly targeted as well (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015; Hanniman, 2008). Proactive measures of this nature also involve the gathering of information that has no relation to criminal activity and if it is insufficiently monitored, this can lead to the misuse of information (White, 2012). Finally, the government’s thirst for intelligence can also lead to the dissolution of legal constraints, increased police powers (abuse of power), increase in detention without trial, and in the worst case, the use of torture tactics (Townshend, 2011).

When considering the hazards of counter-terrorism policing, it becomes apparent that the alienation of Muslims and the counterproductive nature of current approaches can potentially lead to further terrorism. Police have become so occupied with catching suspects that they are neglecting their role of helping clients, which erodes the relations between police and diverse communities (Grabosky, 2008). An unclear understanding of police roles in “prevention, preparedness, response and recovery” aspects of counter-terrorism can also lead to police inefficacy (Pickering et al., 2008, p. 97). Many governments fail to recognize that preventive measures are of equal, if not greater, importance in combating terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Medaris, 2007; Pickering et al., 2008; Skogan, 2011; Sorrell, 2011; Spalek, 2010). The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2005 contains four strands of counter-terrorism measures, which include prevention, pursuit, protection, and response (Sorell, 2011). Yet, the only strands that explicitly pertain to the police are pursuit and protection. These two strands

require securing borders against terrorists, as well as the arrest and prosecution of those encountered (Sorell, 2011). This causes many frontline officers to view counter-terrorism as an issue beyond the scope of their position and as something that is handled better by specialist units (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Thatcher, 2005). Despite the best efforts of officers in counter-terrorism policing, it will prove ineffective without a concerted effort to engage with the community and establish partnerships (Hasisi et al., 2009).

### **The promise of community policing**

Community policing presents an alternative counter-terrorism strategy as building relationships with communities of ethnic and religious diversity is imperative alongside counter-terrorism policing approaches (Pickering et al., 2008). Police officers are the closest to diverse populations due to their work in the field; it is important to understand officers' role in preventing and responding to terrorist activity. The police are the best-equipped law enforcers in society because they can build relationships with community members that express their support of radical ideologies by providing shelter and financial assistance for terrorists (Skogan, 2006; Tyler, 2012). It is arguable that counter-terrorism policing and community policing are incompatible; however, the purpose of this section is to highlight how community policing approaches have been and can be incorporated to strengthen relationships with Muslim communities, and ultimately prevent terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Feucht, Weisburd, Perry, Felson Mock & Hakimi, 2009; Grabosky, 2008; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014; Kirk et al., 2012; Murray, 2005).

As Tyler et al. (2010) note, research has failed to consider the most suitable policing strategies to rectify and decrease terrorism. However, some scholars suggest that it would be beneficial to attempt to shape the behaviour of community members that may be supportive of

radical ideologies (Grabosky, 2008; Skogan, 2006; Tyler et al., 2010; Tyler, 2012). If the police can enter these communities, they may be able to sever the source of support for radical ideologies (Skogan, 2006; Tyler, 2012). Community policing is not defined by a standardized set of programs, but instead, it is viewed as an organizational strategy that creates changes in police culture and decision making (Skogan & Steiner, 2004; Skogan, 2006). Community policing has three fundamental elements, which include “citizen involvement, problem solving, and decentralization” (Weisburd & Braga, 2006, p. 28). Through communication and engagement with community members, police officers establish a strong rapport with communities and stay informed, which also discourages police officers from adopting the pre-existing “we versus they” stance towards citizens (Paoline, Myers & Worden, 2000, p. 581; Weisburd & Braga, 2006). The success of community policing is contingent on police-public partnerships and police response to citizen input (Skogan, 2006). Moreover, police officers are encouraged to lead community efforts by endorsing involvement in neighbourhood watches and citizen patrols, which is important in the context of counter-terrorism (Skogan, 2006; Walsh, 2014). For example, many US states have prioritized citizen watch programs to reduce criminal activity (Walsh, 2014).

Community policing is viewed as a fundamental preventive counter-terrorism measure (Grabosky, 2008; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014; Pickering et al., 2008; Skogan, 2006; Spalek, 2010); yet, as some studies have noted, reactive measures continue to take precedence over prevention in current counter-terrorism policing approaches (Pickering et al., 2008; Sorell, 2011). Alternatively, community policing encourages officers to be proactive and focus on relationship-building practices (Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Guelke, 2006; Medaris, 2007; Townshend, 2011). The purpose of community policing is not to increase suspicion or stop and search powers, but instead, to build connections and trust with the population (Armenta, 2016;

Pickering et al., 2008; Skogan, 2006). Traditional policing requires officers to speed to crime scenes or terrorist attacks and complete paperwork after an incident and, in many cases, the devastation and damage is irreparable (Grabosky, 2008). Furthermore, community policing can enhance the current intelligence gathering process since better relations increase flows of information to authorities (Hasisi et al., 2009). Achieving these positive and ideal outcomes is clearly challenging (Cherney & Murphy, 2013); however, community policing initiatives in Israel, the US, and the UK serve as exemplary models in this developing field (Hasisi, et al., 2009; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014; Lum et al., 2009; Medaris, 2007; Spalek, 2010; White, 2012).

**Israeli police as educators and Civil Guard recruiters.** The Israeli police realize that it is necessary to have a community presence to build connections with the community (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014). They have expanded their role as educators by entering schools and public spaces to educate the civilian population on how to detect terrorist activity (Hasisi, et al., 2009; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014). The Israeli police encourage children and adults to report any suspicious objects or people, which gives all individuals the confidence that their claims are taken seriously and their safety is valued. Furthermore, they encourage all Israeli citizens, regardless of their religion, to join the Civil Guard and directly assist in police work and counter-terrorism efforts. Civil Guard volunteers are given powers that range from being armed with weapons to making arrests (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014). These efforts are an attempt to repair the relationship between the police and minority populations, encourage frequent interaction with communities, enhance civilian awareness of terrorist activity, and ensure higher rates of reporting to decrease terrorist incidents (Deflem, 2010; Hasisi, et al., 2009; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014).



**Communities Against Terrorism.** The US also has a community policing program in place called Communities Against Terrorism (CAT). The purpose of CAT is also to foster community partnerships, with a specific focus on spreading awareness to local business owners whose stores may be frequented by terrorists (Medaris, 2007; White, 2012). This is an important preventive measure as terrorists often purchase items from local stores in preparation for terrorist attacks. For instance, landscaping and farm supply stores are given information about potential explosives that may be purchased to flag potential terrorists and contact local authorities in a pre-emptive attempt to stop the individual from carrying out the attack (Medaris, 2007; White, 2012). Although all neighbourhoods are not equally at risk, it is important to spread awareness to all jurisdictions as terrorists often purchase supplies from areas that are distant from the attack site (Medaris, 2007). Moreover, the main goal of CAT is to “shift local law enforcement from ‘first responders’ to ‘first preventers,’” alert and inform all citizens, which also enhances information sharing capabilities (Medaris, 2007, p. 71).

**Muslim Contact Unit.** Finally, the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) serves as an example of the structure and functioning of a specialist unit designated for Muslim communities. The MCU is modelled after current community policing units and it has been incorporated in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London (Lum et al., 2009). The unit was established in 2002 and they have been involved in many collaborative initiatives with the Muslim Safety Forum. The MCU illustrates a radical shift from traditional counter-terrorism policing which has placed national security agendas before the concerns of communities (Murphy 2007). In 2008, the MCU merged with the Counter Terrorism Command as part of the community engagement team.

The MCU was created to improve counter-terrorism efforts by specifically engaging with Muslim communities and establishing a new “policing by consent order” (Spalek, 2010, p. 193). The MCU’s mission is to build connections and work with local Muslim community leaders and Muslim youth as partners, rather than informants (Spalek, 2010). To enhance this function, some police within this unit are Muslim; however, as Black and Kari (2010) note, diversity within police agencies does not always elicit intended effects, as minority groups continue to express very low levels of confidence and satisfaction with police services. This suggests that other measures are necessary to enhance relationships between the police and Muslim populations. In a similar vein, the MCU is kept at an arm’s length during police raids in Muslim communities to prevent any negative sentiment towards the police officers in the unit as an attempt to establish and maintain a positive relationship (Spalek, 2010). Following police raids, the MCU has a noticeable presence in affected communities to reduce tensions and explain the actions of the police officers involved in the raid (Lum et al., 2009).

The success of a police unit comparable to the MCU is based on trust. Without trust, there are reduced opportunities to engage with Muslim communities and obtain useful intelligence. It is important to avoid “partnership models that exploit trust for intelligence ... [and create] true partnerships [instead]” (Innes, 2006; Spalek, 2010, p. 679). This is one of the main distinctions of the MCU, as the unit is predicated on establishing a relationship centred on trust, whereas other policing initiatives have failed (Spalek, 2010). There is a need to explore alternative ways of trust building before creating a community policing model alongside counter-terrorism initiatives. Current community policing programs that solely seek to enter communities to gather intelligence often alienate the population and cause greater hostility (Hanniman, 2008); therefore, police engagement must go beyond information sharing.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

This research has found that there is a lack of appropriate proactive and reactive police counter-terrorism responses, as many of these responses target Muslim populations. There is room to develop both proactive and reactive counter-terrorism approaches by engaging in community initiatives, which is identified as one of the key factors to consider in counter-terrorism approaches. Although the direct effects of police engaging in counter-terrorism education, Civil Guard recruitment, CAT, and the MCU are inconclusive, it is arguable that the three models and approaches bear merit when considering ways to rectify deficiencies in the current counter-terrorism policing infrastructure. These models and approaches reveal the importance of relationship-building with at-risk communities to foster an environment of trust, inclusion, and positive interactions.

Community policing alone, cannot eradicate terrorism; however, the same can be said about counter-terrorism policing. There is a need to incorporate community police and counter-terrorism policing decision making processes into police actions and interactions with Muslim populations. It is imperative to consider the effects of obtrusive, targeted, and policing approaches that are not founded on best practices, as they serve to tarnish relationships and counteract any progress made between the police and Muslim communities (Hanniman, 2008; McGarrell et al., 2007). The maintenance of a trusting relationship between communities that may be considered high-risk is imperative in risk-reduction; yet, traditional policing methods often destroy the element that they seek to strengthen (Grabosky, 2008).

As previously noted, one of the fundamental goals of terrorists is to divide nations; yet ironically, some contemporary counter-terrorist police approaches do just that (Ganor, 2009; Innes, 2006; Townshend, 2011). However, if police services approach terrorism by bringing

individuals together and establishing trusting relationships with Muslim communities through openness and transparency, preventive counter-terrorism measures can possibly be improved (Spalek, 2010). This relationship can be developed in various ways, which include but are not limited to, attending community gatherings held in mosques, schools, and community centres, attending festivals to learn, and initiating positive interactions (without the intent of gathering intelligence) to get to know community members.

Police responses to terrorism can potentially have very adverse effects on Muslim immigrants (Cole, 2002; Hanniman, 2008; Innes, 2006; Lum et al., 2009; McGarrell et al., 2007). Migrant populations have faced differential treatment that infringes on their human rights, which was amplified following 9/11 as Muslim immigrant populations faced extreme levels of stigmatization, discrimination, and alienation. This treatment is arguably part of the reason for the continuation of terrorist acts almost two decades later (Fassin, 2011; Fox & Akbaba, 2015; Hanniman, 2008; Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010; Murphy, 2007; Satzewich, 1989; Spencer, 2008; Stuart et al., 2008; Stumpf, 2006; Taylor, 2002; Van der Leun, 2006; Walsh, 2016; Welch, 2006). Western police services have taken many different approaches to combat terrorism; however, these approaches often reinforce traditional policing practices, which are sometimes overly aggressive, punitive, and discriminatory (Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Grabosky, 2008). The return to traditional policing practices has fuelled increased levels of cynicism towards police officers and all citizens in the countries where police services target Muslim immigrant populations (Stuart et al., 2015).

The poor treatment, animosity, and scapegoating of Muslim immigrants has a significant impact on their inclination to engage in terrorist activity as a response to the perceived injustices they face due to counter-terrorist policing models. It is possible that continued efforts towards

community policing initiatives have the potential to repair relationships between Muslim populations and the police (Poynting & Mason, 2008). However, practices such as racial and religious profiling of Muslims as possible terrorists greatly inhibit the prospect of improving these relations (Hanniman, 2008). Racial and religious profiling leads to the continued stigmatization and discrimination against Muslims, which will cause them to engage in greater amounts of system avoidance, frustration, violence, and ultimately lead to the attenuation of democracy (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Brayne, 2014; Stuart et al., 2015; Van der Leun, 2006). The social problems that could result without a change in counter-terrorism policing are not limited to those suggested, as this issue creates endemic issues in society from a functionalist, political, human rights, and economic perspective. Ultimately, without a concerted effort to establish a trusting relationship between the police, Muslim immigrants, and society at large, it is difficult to foresee a decrease in the amount of terrorist incidents.

Community policing initiatives have the prospect of uniting all communities while reducing levels of discrimination, strengthening partnerships between police and populations they serve, setting examples of peaceful endeavours, and encouraging the joint effort in terrorism prevention. Some argue that the best response to terrorism is fearlessness; however, having no fear should not equate to inaction (Townshend, 2011). On the contrary, severe and punitive police responses are not more effective, as punitive responses often elicit negative results and further aggression towards the police and whole population. In turn, it seems apropos to respond in a way that is not guided by fear, absence of fear, or an extension of a punitive agenda, such as the War of Terror. Instead, responses should be delivered to convey confidence in the ability to repair communities and nations by uniting all populations; consequently, community-focused approaches would strengthen the ability of law enforcement to prevent and respond to terrorism.

**Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank Dr. James Walsh, Dr. Phillip Shon, Dr. Aziz Douai, and Ms. Tessa Troughton for their diligent efforts throughout this endeavour; from their content suggestions to lessons in writing, they have helped me grow as a student, scholar, and professional. I would also like to express my gratitude to Mary, Charles, Matthew, and Patrick for challenging me to consider different perspectives and for providing endless encouragement and guidance.

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